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Constructing Institutional Safeguards in Fast Track Legislation to Maintain the Legal Politics of Law-Making for the Paramount Interest of the People

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Abstract: Fast Track Legislation (FTL) as a method of law-making began to be practiced in Indonesia during the administration of President Joko Widodo. In contrast to other jurisdictions where FTL has long been institutionalized and operates without major controversy, its practice in Indonesia has provoked extensive public rejection. Drafting and passing laws at extraordinary speed has been criticized as procedurally defective, substantively inadequate, and inconsistent with the foundational principles of the rule of law and democratic constitutionalism. Consequently, laws formulated through this FTL have frequently been challenged by the public before the Constitutional Court through judicial review. This study examines the epistemological and ontological conception of FTL; how FTL is regulated and practiced in several countries; and what the ideal concept would be for formulating FTL in Indonesia in order to align legislative politics with the nation's legal ideals. This study applies a normative juridical approach through literature review and comparative analysis. The findings are as follows: first, several countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand, regulate FTL as a law-making method, but restrict its application to extraordinary measures, rather than adopting it as a standard legislative procedure. Second, adopting FTL into Indonesia requires modification and contextual adaptation to the country's constitutional and socio-political context. Third, establishing clear normative boundaries and institutional safeguards is essential in implementing FTL to ensure that the legal politics of law-making genuinely serve the paramount interest of the people.

Keyword: Legislation, Law, Fast Track Legislation, Legal Politics.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) began to be evident in the process of lawmaking in Indonesia during the administration of President Joko Widodo, marking a significant change in the dynamics of national legal politics. (Huda, Rishan, & Pratiwi, 2024) The concept of accelerated legislation first received widespread attention when the

government and the House of Representatives passed Law Number 6 of 2023 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulation instead of Law Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law, which was processed in a relatively short time, followed by the ratification of Law Number 17 of 2023 concerning Health and Law Number 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital (IKN) which were also discussed at an extraordinarily fast legislative tempo. (Miladmahesi et al., 2023) The marathon drafting and deliberation process, minimal public participation, and lack of transparency have drawn sharp criticism from various groups, including academics, civil society organizations, and legal institutions. They believe that the accelerated legislation ignores the fundamental principles of legislative formation, particularly openness, public participation, and prudence in formulating legal norms that have broad impacts on the people. (Owen et al., 2022) The widespread public reaction, seen in the form of demonstrations, petitions, and judicial review applications to the Constitutional Court, reflects a crisis of confidence in the national legislative process. Socially and politically, the practice of fast-track legislation has polarized the government and the public, weakened the legal legitimacy of these legislative products, and raised fundamental questions about the direction of Indonesian legal policy in balancing the efficiency of lawmaking with democratic principles and the interests of the people as the ultimate goal. Procedural problems in the formation of fast-track legislation in Indonesia are rooted in violations of fundamental principles of the rule of law and the principles of good legislative formation, as stipulated in Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation and its amendments. Principles such as *lex certa*, openness, public participation, and accountability are often ignored in the pursuit of time efficiency in the legislative process. (Omri & Jabeur, 2024) In practice, the stages from planning to enactment are often carried out in a very short time, without providing sufficient space for the public and stakeholders to provide substantial input. The deliberation mechanism in the House of Representatives (DPR) is often a formality, with the dominance of political power suppressing the deliberative function of the legislative body (Gjerde et al., 2022). It indicates a deviation from the formal provisions governing the stages of planning, drafting, discussion, and enactment, which should be carried out systematically, participatively, and transparently. (Mamesah, 2023)

From a substantive perspective, legislation produced through the fast-track mechanism tends to exhibit weak and immature normative quality. The hasty drafting of the law's content results in articles open to multiple interpretations, overlapping, or even contradicting other applicable regulations. (Haryono & Gusliana, 2024) It reveals that the effectiveness and speed of legislation do not always equate to the quality of its results. Furthermore, the substance of many laws resulting from the fast-track mechanism is deemed not to reflect the constitutional values and legal ideals of Pancasila, particularly regarding social justice, human rights protection, and the balance between state interests and the welfare of the people. (Fadli et al., 2023) Legislation, which should be a regulatory instrument for achieving the public good, is often perceived as favoring the economic and political interests of certain groups.

Criticism of the quality of fast-track legislation is further strengthened by the high frequency of judicial review of laws resulting from this mechanism in the Constitutional Court. The numerous constitutional review petitions filed by the public indicate public dissatisfaction with the process and substance of the resulting laws. The Constitutional Court's repeated rulings, which have declared FTL laws conditionally unconstitutional, are a clear indicator of weak legal legitimacy and a lack of prudence in norm formation. (Mokoagow, 2024) This situation not only demonstrates procedural and substantive flaws but also demonstrates an imbalance between the interests of government efficiency and the principles of democracy and constitutionalism. Thus, the practice of fast-track legislation in

Indonesia still poses serious challenges in maintaining the integrity of legal politics and public trust in the national legal system. (Aryanto, Harijanti, & Susanto, 2021)

Internationally, the implementation of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) has long been recognized in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand, but with strict regulations and limited scope. In the UK, FTL is implemented through the Emergency Bill Procedure mechanism, a special procedure to address emergencies requiring a rapid legislative response, such as national security threats or economic crises. Its use requires approval from the House of Commons and the House of Lords while maintaining public transparency. (Aryanto B., 2025) In the United States, a similar concept is known as Fast Track Authority or Trade Promotion Authority in the context of international trade agreements, where Congress grants the President limited authority to expedite the ratification process with strict oversight and a clear timeframe. (Koh, 1992) Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the implementation of the Urgency Motion allows for accelerated deliberation of draft laws, but it must undergo strict parliamentary oversight and be publicly reported. (Fletcher, 2021) All three countries view the Urgency Motion as an extraordinary measure used only in special circumstances, not as a standard legislative procedure that replaces the normal democratic process.

The normative limitations and oversight mechanisms in the implementation of the Urgency Motion in these countries are essential for maintaining a balance between efficiency and legal legitimacy. The United Kingdom applies the principle of ministerial accountability, where every proposed expedited legislation must be accounted for by the relevant minister before parliament and the public. The United States limits the scope of the Urgency Motion to specific issues and requires prior consultation with Congress before implementing the expedited motion. In New Zealand, parliament retains the right to review expedited legislation within a specified period through a review committee mechanism. All of these mechanisms serve as checks and balances to ensure that expedited legislation is not used arbitrarily by the executive. Furthermore, transparency and openness of information are key prerequisites for maintaining public legitimacy for legislative outcomes. (Prasetyo, 2024)

From this international practice, several important lessons can be adapted to the Indonesian context. First, the implementation of fast-track legislation must have clear normative limitations, both in terms of the conditions of application and the legal substance that may be expedited. Second, institutional safeguards must be established to guarantee public accountability and participation, for example, by strengthening the oversight function of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), expanding access to digital public consultations, and clarifying the role of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the constitutionality of the legislative process. Third, the FTL system in Indonesia should be equipped with evaluation and post-legislative review mechanisms to measure the effectiveness and social impact of expedited laws. Thus, accelerated legislation should not only be an instrument of political efficiency but also remain grounded in the principles of accountability, transparency, checks and balances, and public participation, ensuring that national legal policy is truly oriented toward the primary interests of the people, rather than short-term power interests.

The urgency of research on Fast Track Legislation (FTL) in Indonesia lies in the widening gap between the practice of accelerated legislation and the principles of democratic legal politics, which place public participation, transparency, and accountability as the main pillars of lawmaking. In the context of Indonesian constitutional law, accelerated deliberation and enactment of laws are often done under the pretext of efficiency and urgent needs, but in reality, it has the potential to ignore the basic values of the rule of law and weaken the legislative oversight function. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate an ideal concept of FTL that not only adapts to the character of the Indonesian legal system and constitution but also

maintains a balance between the speed of the process and the substantive legitimacy of the resulting legal product. This research is important because it can provide a theoretical contribution in the form of strengthening the conceptual framework regarding the position of FTL in the national legal system, as well as a practical contribution in the form of recommendations for the establishment of mechanisms and institutional safeguards that ensure that every fast-track legislative process remains based on the principles of constitutional democracy. Thus, the results of this study are expected to play a role in encouraging reform of the law-making system in Indonesia towards a more responsive, participatory, and just direction, in accordance with the legal ideals of Pancasila and the primary interests of the people.

METHOD

This research uses a normative juridical research method by focusing on the study of positive legal norms, legal principles, and doctrines related to the implementation of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) in the Indonesian legal system. The approaches used include a statute approach and a conceptual approach. The statutory approach is carried out by examining various relevant regulations, such as Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation and its amendments, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and various laws formed through the fast-track legislation mechanism, such as Law No. 6 of 2023 concerning Job Creation, Law No. 17 of 2023 concerning Health, and Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the IKN. Meanwhile, the conceptual approach is used to understand the basic ideas regarding institutional safeguards, the principle of checks and balances, and the correlation between legislative efficiency and legal legitimacy from a democratic legal politics perspective. The data sources in this study consist of primary legal materials (statutory regulations, Constitutional Court decisions), secondary legal materials (legal literature, scientific journals, previous research results), and tertiary legal materials (legal dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other supporting sources). The data collection technique was carried out through library research by tracing, identifying, and reviewing relevant legal documents and academic literature. Furthermore, the data analysis technique used is normative qualitative analysis, namely by systematically interpreting legal regulations and concepts, then assessing their consistency and relevance to the principles of the rule of law and the legal ideals of Pancasila, to formulate an ideal conceptual model of institutional safeguards in the implementation of fast-track legislation in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Dynamics and Problems of Implementing Fast Track Legislation in Indonesia

The emergence of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) in Indonesia is inextricably linked to the political dynamics and legal policies under President Joko Widodo, who emphasized accelerated economic development and regulatory efficiency as part of the national strategy. With increasing bureaucratic complexity and overlapping regulations, the government recognized the need for a faster legislative mechanism to support investment and economic growth. In this context, the idea of fast-tracking legislation began to be implemented, particularly with the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation, which was later ratified as Law Number 6 of 2023. This FTL concept has de facto become a new method in the Indonesian legislative process, although it is not yet explicitly regulated in the existing legal system. This policy was then followed by several other laws, also drafted at an extraordinarily fast legislative pace, demonstrating a systematic pattern by the government in prioritizing procedural efficiency over democratic deliberative processes. (Nugroho et al., 2024)

From a legal politics perspective, the emergence of Fast Track Legislation reflects a paradigm shift in the governance of national lawmaking, where speed and efficiency are used as measures of legislative success. The government believes that conventional legislative procedures, which are lengthy and involve many actors, often hamper the national development agenda. Therefore, the fast-track approach is seen as a solution to minimize bureaucratic obstacles, accelerate the implementation of strategic policies, and increase Indonesia's economic competitiveness amidst global competition. However, on the other hand, the implementation of Fast Track Legislation also raises concerns that the lawmaking process could become trapped in the logic of pragmatic power politics, where public aspirations and oversight mechanisms are sidelined. It creates a dilemma between the need for government efficiency and a commitment to the principles of the rule of law and constitutional democracy. (Althof & Sumriyadi, 2023)

One of the main characteristics of fast-track legislation is the significant acceleration of all stages of lawmaking, from planning and drafting to enactment. This practice was clearly evident in the drafting and ratification of Law No. 6 of 2023 concerning Job Creation, where discussions were held in a relatively short and compressed timeframe, involving government teams and the House of Representatives (DPR), without adequate space for public participation. A similar process occurred with Law No. 17 of 2023 concerning Health, where the government claimed the urgency of national health system reform as the reason for the acceleration, and with Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital (IKN), where deliberations took less than two months. These three examples demonstrate a consistent pattern: speed of legislation was prioritized without being balanced by the quality of deliberation and transparency that should be hallmarks of a democratic legislative system. (Sanyoto et al., 2023)

Normatively, Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation explicitly regulates the stages and principles of law formation, starting from planning in the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), drafting academic papers, public participation, and joint discussions between the House of Representatives (DPR) and the government. However, in practice, FTL tends to shorten or even skip these stages due to urgency and efficiency. For example, in the formation of the Job Creation Law, many criticized the lack of broad civil society involvement in the development of the academic paper and the limited access to draft laws during the deliberations (Rishan, 2022). It indicates a violation of the principles of openness and public participation as mandated by Law 12/2011 and raises serious questions about the procedural legitimacy of laws produced through this accelerated mechanism.

The practice of Fast Track Legislation in Indonesia demonstrates an imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches, with the House of Representatives (DPR) often serving only as a formal legitimization of draft laws prepared by the government. The situation raises concerns that the DPR's role as a law-making body equal to the government is weakening, while executive dominance is strengthening. In the context of legal politics, this leads to the phenomenon of executive heavyweight, where the legislative process becomes a mere instrument of government politics without effective oversight mechanisms. As a result, the quality of laws produced through the fast-track is often questioned, both in terms of immature legal substance and their compliance with constitutional principles. This situation demonstrates that legislative efficiency without balanced oversight and participation mechanisms has the potential to weaken legal legitimacy and undermine public trust in lawmaking institutions. (Putra & Amnan, 2024)

The implementation of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) in Indonesia has resulted in various violations of the principles and fundamental principles of legislative formation as stipulated in Law Number 12 of 2011 and its amendments. These principles, such as the rule

of law, transparency, public participation, and public accountability, are fundamental to the legitimacy of the legislative process in a democratic, rule-of-law state. However, in practice, the FTL mechanism is often characterized by closed deliberations and minimal public consultation. The absence of public deliberation in the formation of laws such as Law No. 6 of 2023 concerning Job Creation and Law No. 17 of 2023 concerning Health demonstrates a deviation from the principle of openness, where the public is denied the opportunity to understand and critique the contents of draft laws before they are enacted. As a result, the principle of the rule of law, which demands certainty, justice, and public involvement in lawmaking, is diminished by the logic of political efficiency, which prioritizes speed over legal quality. (Winoto, 2023)

Furthermore, the practice of fast-track legislation has disregarded the principle of *lex certa*, namely the clarity of normative formulation and legal certainty, which are essential requirements for the validity of a law. A hasty legislative process often results in articles that are open to multiple interpretations, out of sync with other regulations, and even internally contradictory. For example, in the Job Creation Law, several editorial errors and inconsistencies between articles were discovered, indicating a weak legal substance formulation process. This situation demonstrates a deviation from the principle of integration of the national legal system, which requires that all regulations be drafted harmoniously to avoid conflicting norms. These editorial inaccuracies and vague norms are not merely technical issues but also reflect a violation of the principle of legislative prudence, as stipulated in Article 5 of Law 12/2011. Thus, disregard for the principle of *lex certa* not only diminishes the quality of the law but also creates uncertainty for the public who are subject to the law.

Violations of these principles have a direct impact on the legal legitimacy and quality of laws produced through fast-track legislation. Legal legitimacy stems not only from the authority of the legislators but also from public acceptance of the legislative process and outcomes. When the public feels excluded and the legislative process is conducted behind closed doors, the public's sense of justice is undermined. The lack of transparency and participation results in a lack of public ownership of the resulting legal products, resulting in low compliance with the law. Furthermore, weak accountability in the Fast Track Legislation process leads to a crisis of trust in law-making institutions such as the House of Representatives (DPR) and the government. In the long term, this situation has the potential to erode the authority of the law and worsen the quality of democratic governance.

The social, political, and legal impacts of implementing fast-track legislation are clearly visible through a massive wave of public backlash. The public, academics, and civil society organizations believe that accelerated legislation ignores the people's aspirations and the principles of procedural democracy. The enactment of the Job Creation Law and the Health Law, for example, sparked massive protests in various regions, with the public demanding greater transparency and participation in national policymaking. Furthermore, the numerous judicial review applications filed with the Constitutional Court demonstrate that the public is pursuing legal action to challenge laws deemed procedurally and substantively flawed. Constitutional Court Decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, which declared the Job Creation Law conditionally unconstitutional, is concrete evidence that violations of the principles of legislative formation can lead to judicial annulment. This phenomenon demonstrates a serious tension between the government's political legitimacy and constitutional legitimacy in national legislative practice.

The socio-political implications of fast-track legislative practices also include increased societal polarization and decreased public trust in state institutions. When the legislative process is perceived as an instrument of power that marginalizes the interests of the people, the gap between the government and the public widens. It creates social instability

and weakens the basis of democratic legitimacy. Legally, expedited legislation without coordination between sectors often leads to inconsistent norms, overlapping regulations, and even regulatory conflicts between new and existing laws. For example, several provisions in the Job Creation Law and the Manpower Law have caused confusion in their implementation due to differences in formulation and scope of regulation. This disharmony in the legal system demonstrates that the speed of legislation without substantive integration actually results in ineffective and difficult-to-implement laws.

From a legal-political perspective, the position of FTL within the Indonesian legal system requires a critical examination to determine whether it aligns with the ideals of national law, which are based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. According to Indonesian legal ideals, the formation of legislation must be oriented towards social justice, humanity, and the welfare of the people. However, the practice of FTL actually demonstrates a shift in orientation from the principle of justice to political efficiency and economic interests. When legislation is viewed more as an instrument to accelerate economic policy than as a means to achieve substantive justice, Indonesian legal politics loses its normative direction. Therefore, it must be emphasized that political efficiency must not sacrifice the principles of constitutional democracy. Fast-track legislation is acceptable only as long as it ensures public involvement, transparency, and respect for citizens' constitutional rights. Therefore, the practice of fast-track legislation must be reconstructed to align with the fundamental values of the Pancasila state based on the rule of law, where law is not a tool of power, but rather an instrument for upholding justice and the welfare of the people.

Institutional Safeguard Model in Fast Track Legislation for the Indonesian Context

The conceptualization of institutional safeguards in Fast Track Legislation (FTL) is an effort to build a safeguard system that maintains a balance between legislative efficiency and the principles of the rule of law, constitutional democracy, and public participation. Conceptually, institutional safeguards can be understood as a set of institutional mechanisms that function to prevent abuse of power in the accelerated legislative process. The goal is to ensure that the acceleration of lawmaking does not sacrifice quality, clarity of norms, or public involvement. Safeguards are also closely related to the principle of checks and balances, where the legislative and executive branches must check each other to prevent the dominance of one party in the lawmaking process. In the context of the rule of law, safeguards ensure that accelerated legislation remains within the legal and constitutional framework, rather than simply being driven by political or economic interests. Meanwhile, from a public participation perspective, the existence of safeguards allows the public to retain space for aspirations, even though the legislative process is carried out within a limited time. Theoretically, the application of safeguards aligns with the principles of good governance and deliberative democracy, which emphasize the importance of openness, rationality, and responsibility in the legislative process. In the Indonesian context, the application of this concept is relevant given that the practice of fast-track legislation is often marred by a legitimacy crisis due to weak transparency and minimal public accountability.

Lessons learned from the implementation of Fast Track Legislation in other countries demonstrate that accelerated legislation is not taboo but is always accompanied by a strong oversight system. In the United Kingdom, for example, the fast-track mechanism is only applied in emergencies or urgent needs approved by Parliament, and each expedited process must be accompanied by a written public report and a post-approval evaluation. In the United States, the concept of fast-track authority is known in the context of trade policy, where the President can expedite the submission of bills while still granting Congress full authority to approve or reject them without amendment, a form of strict legislative control. Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the Fast Track procedure is clearly stipulated in the Standing Orders of the

House of Representatives, with an obligation for parliamentary committees to maintain public consultations despite limited deliberation time. From these three countries, several universal principles can be identified that Indonesia can adopt: (1) clear normative boundaries for when FTL can be used; (2) active involvement of parliament and the public in oversight; (3) transparency of the legislative process through the publication of official documents and reports; and (4) a post-legislative evaluation mechanism to assess effectiveness and compliance with legal principles. This study confirms that the ideal fast-track legislative process is not merely fast, but also measurable, monitored, and constitutionally accountable.

In the Indonesian context, the implementation of fast-track legislation requires strict normative limitations to prevent its misuse as a political instrument of power. The conditions and criteria for implementing fast-track legislation must be limited to specific circumstances such as national emergencies, major disasters, economic crises, or urgent needs that are strategic and have a broad impact on the public interest. Time and scope limitations must also be explicitly regulated, for example by determining the maximum deliberation period and the types of laws that can be submitted through the fast-track mechanism. Furthermore, it is necessary to revise Law No. 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislation by adding articles that explicitly regulate fast-track legislation, including its procedures, responsibilities, and oversight mechanisms. This provision will provide a strong legal basis and prevent the arbitrary practices of fast-track legislation. Without clear regulations, the FTL risks becoming a political tool that overrides the principle of prudence and public deliberation, thus creating constitutional issues down the road. Therefore, normative restrictions are not merely procedural technicalities, but also a manifestation of a commitment to rule-of-law governance and substantive democracy.

The implementation of institutional safeguards also requires an active role from state institutions in ensuring that the fast-track legislative process is carried out in accordance with constitutional principles. The House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) have primary responsibility for maintaining legislative and oversight functions through the establishment of a special legislative fast-track oversight committee tasked with assessing the feasibility of each proposed fast-track bill. The government (executive) is obliged to ensure information transparency and provide a digital platform that allows the public to access draft bills, provide input, and monitor deliberations in real time. The Constitutional Court can strengthen its function by conducting pre-legislative review, assessing the compliance of the fast-track legislative process with constitutional principles before the law is enacted. Meanwhile, the role of civil society and academics needs to be institutionalized through public hearing mechanisms, citizen participation platforms, and cross-sectoral consultative forums that allow for substantive input despite limited legislative time. With such institutional synergy, accelerated legislation remains under balanced oversight and does not deviate from legitimate legal norms. In principle, the institutional safeguard model in the Fast Track Law (FTL) must be based on five core values: accountability, transparency, checks and balances, public participation, and post-legislative evaluation. The principle of accountability demands that every stage of legislation be legally and morally accountable to the people. Transparency requires the public to be open to documents, schedules, and legal arguments. Checks and balances ensure there is no domination by the executive over the legislature, or vice versa, while public participation ensures there is space for the public to actively engage, both in drafting and evaluating the effectiveness of laws. Finally, post-legislative evaluation is key to measuring the extent to which fast-track legislation achieves its objectives without causing negative impacts on society or the legal system. These principles are not only normative but also practical, serving as guidelines for policymakers in designing a just and sustainable FTL system. By adhering

to these values, Indonesia can ensure that accelerated legislation does not lead to legal authoritarianism but remains grounded in the principles of constitutional democracy.

Based on the above description, an ideal conceptual model for fast-track legislation for Indonesia can be formulated, namely a model that integrates procedural efficiency with substantive legitimacy. The ideal FTL scheme includes the following stages: (1) clear initiation with objective criteria, (2) rapid but open deliberation, (3) digital public consultation to ensure public participation, (4) strict parliamentary oversight, and (5) post-approval judicial and administrative evaluation. This model requires synergy between institutions, where the acceleration of legislation must not sacrifice the principles of democracy and constitutionality. Policy recommendations that can be put forward include the establishment of an independent legislative oversight body, strengthening the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing the process, and developing a data- and technology-based legislative system to accelerate without reducing transparency. Thus, the ideal FTL model is not merely a tool to accelerate legal development, but a strategic instrument to strengthen democratic legal politics and ensure that every legal product truly supports the interests of the people as the highest goal of the Pancasila rule of law.

CONCLUSION

The implementation of Fast Track Legislation (FTL) in Indonesia reflects a fundamental shift in the dynamics of national legal policy, oriented toward efficiency and policy acceleration. However, practices during President Joko Widodo's administration demonstrate that this mechanism has not been accompanied by an adequate safeguard system, whether normative, procedural, or institutional. The absence of strong safeguards has resulted in violations of fundamental principles of legislative formation, such as transparency, public participation, *lex certa*, and the rule of law, thus reducing legal legitimacy and the quality of legislative products. Cases such as Law No. 6 of 2023 concerning Job Creation, Law No. 17 of 2023 concerning Health, and Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital (IKN) are clear examples of how uncontrolled fast-track legislation has sparked public resistance and triggered constitutional review in the Constitutional Court. Therefore, conceptually, the Fast Track Legislation System (FTL) is only acceptable if supported by strong institutional safeguards, including normative limitations, cross-agency oversight mechanisms, and active public involvement in every stage of lawmaking. Within the framework of Indonesian legal politics, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the FTL should function as a strategic instrument to accelerate legal reform and national development, without abandoning the principles of constitutional democracy and social justice for all Indonesians.

Based on these findings and analysis, strategic steps are needed to strengthen the governance of fast-track legislation to align it with the principles of a democratic, rule-of-law state. First, Law Number 12 of 2011 needs to be revised to add explicit provisions regarding the FTL mechanism, including implementation requirements, procedural stages, and strict time limits. Second, a special committee for oversight of fast-track legislation should be established in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD), tasked with ensuring transparency and public participation despite limited deliberation time. Third, the Constitutional Court could be given a role in pre-legislative review to assess the constitutionality of fast-track bills before they are enacted. Fourth, the government needs to develop a participatory digital platform that allows the public and academics to provide online input on every bill submitted through the Fast Track Bill (FTL). Fifth, post-enactment, periodic evaluations of the effectiveness and socio-legal impact of laws enacted through the Fast Track Bill must be conducted to ensure that the legislation truly meets the needs of the community and does not deviate from national legal ideals. Thus, the implementation of Fast Track Legislation in Indonesia can combine speed and efficiency

with accountability, transparency, and a commitment to the interests of the people, as the primary goals of lawmaking in a Pancasila-based state.

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